[Big read] Taiwanese hide fears of potential Taiwan Strait war

Fighter jets streaking across the skies of Taipei, bank runs, stock market crash, emergency evacuation of foreign nationals, cyberattacks, disruption to internet connectivity, utilities and public services, looting… 

These doomsday-like scenes of social unrest before an outbreak of war were vividly depicted in the trailer of Zero Day, a Taiwanese TV drama series that is slated to be aired next year. 

This is the first Taiwanese drama series about a military incursion by mainland China, but it drew a barrage of criticism from Taiwanese after its trailer aired. The Blue Kuomintang camp accused the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) of using government subsidies for the film and TV industry to “conduct cognitive warfare against China”. At the same time, some in the Green DPP camp questioned whether the scenes of societal collapse shown were encouraging capitulation and belittling Taiwan’s defence. 

In an interview with Radio Free Asia, Cheng Hsin-mei, producer and screenwriter for the series, said that the controversy over the trailer shows that the series is being taken seriously. She emphasised that the drama reflects on how Taiwanese would respond if an enemy invaded, and is not about criticising anyone.

A closer examination of the online discussions on the series revealed that putting aside their different political inclinations, a number of Taiwanese have started thinking about how they would react in the event of war. This also reflects that there is indeed a certain degree of anxiety among the Taiwanese public about the Taiwan Strait conflict.

In May 2021, The Economist described Taiwan, which was the centre of geopolitical risk, as “the most dangerous place on earth” in its cover page headline. But whether it was during the military exercises conducted by mainland China in the vicinity of Taiwan following then US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit in 2022, or the “Taiwan blockade” exercises covering Kinmen, Matsu and other outlying islands held by mainland China just three days after Taiwan President Lai Ching-te took office in May this year, the Taiwanese appeared unfazed and continued with their daily lives as usual.

However, given that a conflict could break out at any time in the Taiwan Strait, is the Taiwanese public really so composed? What is their assessment of the likelihood of war breaking out in the Taiwan Strait?

Wang Yu-hsuan (pseudonym), who returned to Taiwan for military service after his graduation from an American university this year, told Lianhe Zaobao that he felt much conflicted after watching the Zero Days trailer. Wang headed to the US to further his studies after high school, but his family remained in Taiwan, so he has no regrets about returning to serve in its military to safeguard his homeland.  

But the trailer made him realise that society would be plunged into unrest even before war starts. He added, “When public morale is in disarray, I am not confident that military conscripts can make a difference, but I am still willing to give my all for my country.”

Hsiao-liao (pseudonym) is a 33-year-old in the finance industry who is looking to marry his girlfriend of ten years this year. After his discharge from a year of military conscript service, he received several mobilisation orders to report for further training, but he does not think that the Taiwanese military provides its reservists with effective training. He said, “If war breaks out, I am definitely surrendering, there is no way to win.”  

Indeed, regardless of whether or not it is a do-or-die battle, Taiwanese men who are facing the pressure of military mobilisation do not seem optimistic about the outcome of a war in the Taiwan Strait; in fact, they are somewhat worried.

The “American Portrait” survey started in 2021 by Wu Chien-Huei, a researcher at the Academia Sinica Institute of European and American Studies (IEAS), regularly investigates the Taiwanese public’s perception of cross-strait and US-Taiwan relations. The latest round of survey was conducted in May when mainland China carried out its military blockade exercises around Taiwan. 

As many as 83.4% of respondents believe that the threat from mainland China is increasing each year; 70.4% believe that if mainland China increases its armaments, the possibility of it attacking Taiwan would also increase; 67.7% believe that the presence of mainland Chinese military aircraft and warships in Taiwan’s sea and air spaces would also increase the likelihood of an attack on Taiwan.

The survey also found that nearly 58% of the Taiwanese public feels that the US would send its military to aid Taiwan if mainland China unilaterally changes the status quo of cross-strait relations and invades Taiwan. Additionally, as many as 93% of the respondents support maintaining the status quo.

In the latest Taiwan National Security Survey commissioned by Duke University and conducted by the National Chengchi University Election Study Centre held from 24 June to 1 July this year, 77.4% of those surveyed feel that the US would come to Taiwan’s aid if mainland China attacks Taiwan despite it maintaining the status quo and not declaring independence. Among them, 35.7% think that the US would send its troops to help Taiwan. 

In addition, 63% of the respondents believe that when war breaks out in the Taiwan Strait, Taiwanese would resist. However, when asked about their individual course of action in the event of war, 25.8% would let nature take its course, 11.9% would escape, 11.3% would join the army, 10% would support the government’s decision, and 6.9% would resist.

These findings show that the Taiwanese public are not indifferent to the Taiwan Strait crisis; in fact, they sense the mounting pressure from Beijing and would prefer to “maintain the status quo” instead of a direct confrontation. If conflict does break out, their attitudes are rather pessimistic, much like what is depicted in the Zero Day trailer.  

During a seminar on 9 August, Academia Sinica IEAS’s Wu pointed out that based on relevant survey data, the public is more confident that the US would send troops to help Taiwan if Beijing takes the initiative to change the status quo and attack Taiwan than if Taiwan were to proactively declare its independence. He believes that this explains why most Taiwanese support maintaining the status quo in one form or another.

At the same seminar, Wu Jieh-min, an Academia Sinica Institute of Sociology (IOS) researcher, pointed out that in most related polls, maintaining the status quo has always been the preference of the absolute majority. This shows that Taiwanese are acutely aware of the geopolitical risks, and explains why they exhibited clearly opportunistic attitudes in their responses and are more inclined towards risk-hedging options.  

However, the outcomes of the public polls conducted over the last eight years by the Academia Sinica’s China Impact research group (中国效应小组) show that when given the choice of “independence after maintaining status quo”, “reunification after maintaining status quo”, or “maintaining status quo forever”, respondents who chose “independence after maintaining status quo” exceeded those who preferred “maintaining status quo forever” since 2020. Even though the percentage of those who opted for “independence after maintaining status quo” has fallen consecutively over the last three years, it remains the popular choice.

In terms of how the risk-hedging mindset of Taiwanese would affect their will to fight in the event of war, Academia Sinica IOS’s Wu told Lianhe Zaobao that based on survey responses to the question of “What next after maintaining the status quo?”, most Taiwanese are very clear that the status quo cannot be maintained indefinitely and they would eventually need to choose.

So, he feels that if war breaks out, the mindsets of Taiwanese are very likely to change. Wu explained that the actions taken by those in power in Taiwan then would also affect its people’s will to fight, and “this is evident from the Ukraine war”. 

Compared with the tense situation in the past few months, there are recent signs of cross-strait tensions easing.

Aside from the Taiwanese government’s Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) and the semi-official Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF), which have indicated a willingness to resume exchanges with mainland China, pragmatic progress has also been made in the 14 February Kinmen capsizing incident, the case of the stranded Kinmen angler surnamed Hu, and the seizure of the Dajinman 88 fishing vessel from Penghu by mainland Chinese authorities.

Furthermore, while mainland Chinese tourists have been unable to visit Taiwan since the start of the Covid-19 pandemic, on 9 August the first Chinese tour group arrived in Matsu from Fujian using the “Mini Three Links” travel arrangement between both places. This was interpreted as a loosening in the restrictions on cross-strait tour groups. 

Also, in mid-July, 155 Chinese government officials and travel industry representatives attended the opening of the Taipei Summer Travel Expo in Taipei. Among them, 29 were Chinese officials, a first since the pandemic.  

During the event, SEF vice-chair Luo Wen-jia commented that the visit by Chinese officials demonstrated the Taiwanese government’s sincerity. He expressed hope that Taiwanese officials could also visit mainland China in the future to facilitate bilateral exchanges. Luo also expressed optimism that tourism could serve as the first step in promoting cross-strait interactions.

At the end of July, a week before representatives from both sides of the Taiwan Strait met in Kinmen for follow-up on the capsizing incident, Luo visited Kinmen and announced that SEF personnel would be stationed at a local service centre for ferry services between Kinmen and nearby mainland Chinese ports. During his visit, Luo also attended the Kinmen-Xiamen Strait-Crossing Swim and remarked that “given how close the two sides are, peace should not be that far away.”

Jhang Hong Yuan, an associate professor of international trade at Chihlee University of Technology, told Lianhe Zaobao that there are two schools of thought within the DPP in dealing with China: the first emphasises “resisting China to protect Taiwan” and cognitive warfare; the other is inclined to preserve cross-strait stability. At present, both the SEF’s Luo and MAC Minister Chiu Chui-Cheng belong to the latter faction.

Jhang pointed out that Luo played a key role in Lai Ching-te’s presidential election campaign. After then SEF chair Cheng Wen-tsan was forced to resign following corruption allegations, Luo continued to make frequent public appearances and express views on cross-strait relations, showing that he had been instructed to do so by top leaders. 

Jhang assessed that, before the US presidential election concludes, cross-strait relations are unlikely to be a primary focus of Lai’s political agenda. Therefore, the introduction of relatively friendly policies and gestures of goodwill are likely tactical adjustments in response to potential shifts in the next US president’s strategic approach to Taiwan, following Biden’s decision to withdraw from the re-election race.

Wang Hsin-Hsien, a distinguished professor at the National Chengchi University’s Graduate Institute of East Asian Studies, explained to Lianhe Zaobao that Taipei chose to adopt a relatively mild and low-key approach on cross-strait issues towards mainland China now to hedge risk, as “all measures to manage risks must be put in place before the US presidential election”. 

Wang believes that when it comes to the fundamentals of the Lai administration’s cross-strait policies, Lai would stick to his position that “the Republic of China and the People’s Republic of China are not subordinate to each other” as mentioned in his inauguration speech on 20 May. At the same time, Beijing will not change its stance on Lai Ching-te due to Taiwan’s relatively conciliatory tone towards cross-strait affairs since July.

Wang also pointed out that when Beijing made use of the Kinmen capsizing incident to send its coast guard vessels into the restricted waters off Kinmen and Matsu, the US did not express concerns beyond routine statements. This would encourage Beijing to further pursue its strategic goals at a time when the Biden administration is too occupied with the US presidential election to deal with Taiwan affairs and the Lai administration has somewhat softened its stance. 

After rolling out 22 guidelines on imposing criminal punishments for Taiwan independence separatists at the end of June, mainland China went a step further on 7 August to set up a dedicated page on the website of its State Council Taiwan Affairs Office to deal with Taiwan secessionists. It also set up an email address for whistle-blowers to share clues and crimes of those who had been named, or anyone else they suspected, underlining its increased efforts to deter Taiwan.

Interviewed Chinese academics also mentioned that mainland China will handle the Taiwan issue in accordance with established policies to seize the initiative and control. At the same time, its opposition to secession efforts will not soften just for the sake of promoting people-to-people exchanges.

Li Zhenguang, head of the Institute of Taiwan Studies at Beijing Union University, told Lianhe Zaobao that mainland China will stick to its two-pronged policy of clamping down on Taiwan’s secession while promoting cross-strait people-to-people exchanges.

Bao Chengke, assistant director of the Institute for East Asian Studies in Shanghai, stressed that the conclusion of the Kinmen capsizing and Dajinman 88 fishing vessel incidents would not ease cross-strait tensions arising from Lai’s new “two states” theory. 

Bao cautioned, “Do not assume that China’s relaxation of its restrictions on people-to-people exchanges means that it would become more tolerant of Taiwan’s secession efforts.”

He added that in time to come, mainland China would roll out more drastic anti-secession policies. He also said, “China will continue to deploy its naval and air force units around Taiwan.”

As for the recent softening of Taiwan’s attitude towards cross-strait exchanges, Beijing Union University’s Li said that mainland China will pay more attention to Lai’s actual actions than his statements. He continued, “For example, the upcoming Shanghai-Taipei City Forum in Taipei can serve as a touchstone on whether the Taiwan authorities are truly willing to promote cross-strait exchanges.”

On the same note, National Chengchi University’s Wang further pointed out that Beijing is still trying to distinguish Lai’s means from his goals. As for the Shanghai-Taipei City Forum to be held in the latter part of this year, Beijing will certainly observe the DPP’s attitude in handling the event, but will want to avoid over-politicisation, so the candidate it sends to Taiwan is unlikely to be the top leader of Shanghai.

He concluded that given the DPP’s attempts to hedge risk in cross-strait relations, the Taiwanese authorities would not prevent the forum from taking place. It at least wants to signal to Beijing its consent for such exchanges, but at the same time, the event will be handled in a low-key manner and positioned as a transactional exchange between municipal authorities.

This article was first published in Lianhe Zaobao as “台海烽火尖上 台湾人假淡定真焦虑”.

Related: Taiwan and Japan’s contrasting reactions to Chinese military drills | Survey on US and Taiwan experts: William Lai’s presidency will see a turbulent Taiwan Strait