Where is China now?
Only by absorbing the essence of modern civilisation can they rise above it, and only by standing on the peak of Western civilisation can they go on to the next level, says East Asian Institute senior research fellow Lance Gore. When one scans the terrain of Chinese public opinion and even academia, we see that very little remains of the constructive mentality once prevalent from the late Qing dynasty onwards - i.e., the spirit of humbly learning from the West for self-strengthening. Instead, we see "cultural self-confidence" that is not substantiated by proper analysis. Furthermore, political reform cannot always revolve around the consolidation of the ruling party's position, and not make plans with the long-term interests of the Chinese people in mind.
Let us imagine that a large-scale poll is being conducted in China right now, posing the following question: "Do you think our country is heading in the right direction?" Commonplace in democracies, such polls allow the government to be informed of the people's sentiments on policies between general elections, so that it can make adjustments.
In countries that lack such a mechanism, leaders may, for quite some time, keep doing what they think is right without realising that something is off. Presently, China is beset by a host of internal and external problems. The postponement of the Third Plenary Session of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)'s Central Committee indicates that the ruling party is divided in opinion and undecided on what to do next.
This is exactly the time for polls to come into play. The three most fundamental philosophical questions every person must address for themselves are: Who am I? Where do I come from? Where am I going? But for China, what's more urgent is to figure out the answer to this: "Where is China now?"
China's development losing steam
China's development since the 1980s has been spectacular. It has made the leap from a poor, backward country to the world's second largest economy and the largest trading partner of more than 140 countries. Going hand in hand with such progress were the rapid developments of China's infrastructure and cities, and the rise in the people's incomes in tandem with economic growth. People were optimistic and confident about the future.
However, in recent years, the situation has taken a sharp turn for the worse. The Chinese economy is in the doldrums, with its three engines - investment, consumption and export - all stalling at the same time. Investment is sluggish, while supply chains are relocating out of the country. Even as the reverberations of one major default after another run through the property sector, local government debt is going through the roof and gone is the vibrancy in the business districts. With unprecedented pessimism about the future, people are tightening their purse strings to prepare for the worst to come.
To a large extent, the Chinese miracle was made possible by the opening up of the developed world to China, which enabled the country to reap massive benefits in terms of technology, research and education, market access, know-how (practical knowledge), talents and so on. But the West now characterises China as an alien and a threat, and is parting ways with it, possibly heading towards a long-term confrontation.
For a hegemonic state to have legitimacy, it must represent the highest level of civilisation.
Legitimacy for hegemony
Although this turn of events is often attributed to the Thucydides Trap brought on by China's meteoric rise, the Thucydides Trap does not suffice to explain China's predicament.
For thousands of years in the history of civilisation, the rise of great powers has been predicated on raw power. The degree of civilisation attainment mattered little. Backward fishing, hunting or nomadic peoples could often easily conquer developed centres of civilisation. Think, for example, the barbarians who brought down the Roman empire, the Mongols who swept across Eurasia on horseback, and the nomads from the north that took over China proper.
However, the world today has formed an international community, in which the level of civilisation is directly linked to whether a country gets approval and acceptance. Gone forever is the age of Genghis Khan-styled world conquest by the slaughtering of entire cities. Not only do small and weak countries survive these days, they are increasing in number. Clearly the rules of the game have changed. For a hegemonic state to have legitimacy, it must represent the highest level of civilisation.
The shock of the rise of China to the global order centred on Western civilisation is obvious to all. Whether the mainstream countries within the present order accept the changes brought about by the rise of China depends, to a large extent, on the level China has achieved in various aspects.
Having the support of third world countries is not going to be very helpful for China here, because the level China seeks to rise above is that of the developed countries.
Rising above the developed world
Historically, countries such as Germany, the Soviet Union and Japan had failed to be accepted despite their great strength - they were defeated by a coalition of mainstream countries. One important reason that the US managed to supersede Britain as the global hegemon was the former's achievements within the same civilisation. As a major power representing a different civilisation, China cannot possibly realise its own rise within the parameters of Western civilisation, for even if it becomes an outstanding exemplar of that civilisation, it could only be relegated to an auxiliary role like Japan.
Besides, the problems of Western civilisation become more pronounced with each passing day. The peaceful rise depends more on whether or not China is able to surpass the highest achievements of contemporary civilisation. It has to contribute to elevating humankind to a higher level of civilisation in order to be recognised and accepted as a leader.
But the reality is that China's popularity in polls of the developed world keeps on sinking to new lows. When China is perceived as an existential threat and fails to be approved and accepted by mainstream countries, its rise encounters endless difficulties and obstacles. Moreover, when these countries join forces, they may be able to derail China's rise. Having the support of third world countries is not going to be very helpful for China here, because the level China seeks to rise above is that of the developed countries.
Did China pass the test?
Undoubtedly, much of the demonisation of China is motivated by prejudice or, worse still, deliberate smearing. Having said that, a simple test of China's current level of civilisation is to observe whether the people there can generally speak their minds. If China fails on this minimum standard, then no wonder it is not gaining approval and acceptance.
Another test is to review how much of the phenomenon that has been hyped by foreign media in recent years is real and how much is fiction: speech and information are blocked, people dare not speak the truth but repeat official clichés or even lies, there is the blocking or shutting down of social media accounts without legal basis, extrajudicial detention and the disappearance of people; excessive surveillance, encouragement of snitching; expansive application of national security; power-for-money deals and monopolies; nepotism; suppression of religious freedom; personality cult and autocracy, in terms of prohibiting "improper gossiping about the party's centre"; forcing absolute loyalty and obedience; replacing rationality and common sense with Party loyalty, a lack of supervision and checks and balances on power, and a lack of space and platform for the masses to participate in and discuss policies.
The CCP often regards these as exaggerated by foreign media, or considers them trivial compared with China's achievements and other advantages of the Chinese system. But if foreigners think that these are part of the "community of a shared future for mankind" advocated by China, it is no wonder that they do not buy it and feel menaced.
To some extent, polls can be substituted by other indicators, such as: whether or not we are seeing mass emigration and capital flight, how confident people are of the future, whether or not investment and consumption are robust, the number of foreigners in the streets, and so on. These are also indicators of whether people think the country is heading in the right direction or not.
Notably, it was only after 2017 that the Western countries decided to go all out to contain China.
Becoming the alien and the threat
Given the stunning achievements of China's economic reform and opening up, there must be much in them for other countries to learn from. China's future course and course of action will depend on how the CCP sums up these achievements.
Notably, it was only after 2017 that the Western countries decided to go all out to contain China. They came to a common understanding among themselves with astonishing speed that China was an alien and a threat. That was actually the point in time when the CCP made a summarising review of China's economic reform and opening up and drew up its blueprint for the future.
In other words, the West did not agree with the summary and the direction set. So, the reasons for worsening relations between China and the West go beyond the Thucydides Trap - the CCP is at odds with the West on fundamental issues.
However, it is unimportant what others think. What really matters at the end of the day is how well China's established guidelines and policies work in practice. But, alas, the leftward shift over the years has brought back many of the evils of the Stalinist system as commonly understood in the West (as enumerated earlier). The turn to the left is guided by a blind faith in the "original aspiration" of the Communists, oblivious at first of its impact both at home and abroad.
A case in point is "common prosperity" as part of the "original aspiration". When this idea was reintroduced, what it presented was just a goal with no feasible programme for reaching it. Together with the return of the official ideology, it caused many in China to believe that class struggle and the dictatorship of the proletariat were coming back, while people elsewhere thought that the Soviet Union was being revived from the dead, so to speak. The ideological and social foundations for the left turn are still strong in China, making it easy for China to slip right back to its old tracks.
Two errors of cognition
Fundamentally, the source of all the troubles can be traced to two errors of cognition.
The first is a misguided confidence in China's system and path, stemming from the blind confidence in "theory", i.e., the official ideology. The top leader has drawn an outlandish conclusion from China's success: "Marxism works!"
Such confidence in theory, marked by a dearth of innovation, has reloaded the ruling party with the ideological baggage of yesteryear. Obviously, it is an inadequate foundation from which to scale the heights of contemporary civilisation.
This is not to say that Marxism is all wrong, but rather that it is far from adequate for the present era of rapid developments in science and technology. It is way too much of a stretch to explain the success of China's economic reform and opening up with Marxism as it is.
Confidence in theory with a dearth of innovation necessarily leads to a return to the old orthodoxy in the system and the path, giving people a sense of backsliding. For one thing, with its emphasis on people's class attributes, Marxism does not genuinely respect human rights, which it regards as a bourgeois facade. The Cultural Revolution proves that the dictatorship of the proletariat is criminality backed by theory but without a legal and moral foundation.
The deepest impetus for a country's development comes from the people, not the ruling party. Putting the cart before the horse will limit China's potential for development in the long term.
The second error is the prioritisation of party building over the nation and the people. Despite the slogan of "putting people at the centre", the basic political reality in China is that everything revolves around the party. This reality sets the limitations of the Chinese model, for it cannot easily be widely accepted, emulated or even understood by the rest of the world.
The deepest impetus for a country's development comes from the people, not the ruling party. Putting the cart before the horse will limit China's potential for development in the long term. What China needs is socialism for its society, not statism for the party-state.
Back to the global mainstream
Fortunately, it is not difficult for China to return to the global mainstream. For that to happen, the first thing that the Chinese must do is to call a spade a spade. Instead of strained efforts to tie China's achievements to Marxism to serve the party's political interests, a more objective account would serve both China and the world well. Only when this causality is straightened out may the CCP "tell China's story well" and, on the basis thereof, raise China's level on all fronts and ascend the pinnacle of human civilisation.
Secondly, the Chinese must stand on the shoulders of giants. Only by absorbing the essence of modern civilisation can they rise above it. And only by standing on the peak of Western civilisation can they go on to the next level.
When one scans the terrain of Chinese public opinion and even academia, very little remains of the constructive mentality once prevalent from the late Qing dynasty onwards - i.e., the spirit of humbly learning from the West for self-strengthening. Instead, we see "cultural self-confidence" that is not substantiated by proper analysis.
There is scarcely any discussion about which essential elements of Chinese civilisation may be combined with which essential elements of Western civilisation to overcome the shortcomings of both sides, forge new advantages and take human civilisation to a new plane. Instead, people easily slide back to the familiar sense of superiority of the "Celestial Empire". It was precisely such a mindset that had brought about China's backwardness and its "century of humiliation".
Transformation of political model and lifestyle
The third thing that must happen is the transformation of the political model. That includes, first of all, the model of party building.
Political reform cannot always revolve around the consolidation of the ruling party's position, and not make plans with the long-term interests of the Chinese people in mind. This has led the CCP to push for the complete infiltration of party organisations and emphasise the centralised, unified leadership of the party, which often degenerates into personal autocracy.
It is erroneous to seek the driving forces of development within the party rather than in society at large. The real driving force in making history is the people, not the ruling party; and the fundamental way to protect the party is to get it rooted in the people. That was the great innovation of Mao Zedong.
However, in reality, we observe that the party's elaborate organisation networks and its monopoly of power and resources have severely encroached on the space for the Chinese people to grow, mature and innovate, stifling society's vitality.
Autonomy is a necessary condition for anyone to grow and mature. China's enormous pyramid of power not only squeezes the space of the people, but also deprives the party's cadres of their autonomy. They spend their days under the binding mantra of "Consciousnesses", "Affirmations", "Upholds" etc., while being criticised for "lying flat", "lying sideways" and engaging in formalism - precisely the expected consequences of such a top-down style of governance.
For the younger generation, however, pleasures and enjoyment define their pursuit in life and constitute the main content of their lives.
And finally, there is a small cultural revolution that must be dealt with. The shortage economy is gone forever. The market economy is driven by consumerism that rejects the culture of thriftiness, hard struggle and abstinence. Thanks to its experience of harsh times, the Red lineage lacks humour and hedonism in its cultural genes. For the younger generation, however, pleasures and enjoyment define their pursuit in life and constitute the main content of their lives.
That existence determines consciousness is a basic principle of Marxism after all. Failure to adjust the party's culture in response to this new reality will result in a disconnect (or even opposition) between the ruling party and the younger generation.
This article was first published in Lianhe Zaobao as "中国在哪里？".
