Why is China struggling with identity politics both within and outside the nation?

This is an era of identity politics for nations, both domestically and in international relations.

Globally, the most important emergent identity divide advocated by the major developed nations is that between democracy and autocracy. Authoritarianism has replaced terrorism and is regarded as the greatest threat to the liberal global order. However, not all nations, especially those in the third world, agree with this divide.

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has rejected this identity divide as a product of the Cold War mentality and vigorously advanced the Belt and Road Initiative and "a community with a shared future for mankind" to counteract the prospects of a new Cold War.

Yet the CCP is most susceptible to the vortex of identity politics. It got its start in identity politics and identity politics is almost the party's second nature. Mao Zedong upheld the view that the primary task of the revolution is to distinguish friend from foe; this belief was prevalent in his political lines, strategies and policies until the very end.

It included the struggle against the landlords, assigning class labels to everyone (划成分), "whole-hearted reliance" on the working class and poor and lower-middle peasants (贫下中农), the "military supporting the left" (三支两军) during the Cultural Revolution, and the denunciation of the "nine categories" - "landlords, rich peasants, counter-revolutionaries, undesirable elements, rightists, traitors, spies, capitalists and intellectuals".

Identity politics is at the root of both Mao's successes and failings.

Identity politics is a means to consolidate political power and is often highly effective in demolishing the old order. The CCP used it to organise and mobilise the peasants en masse, and to direct their discontent towards the "three big mountains" of imperialism, feudalism and bureaucratic capitalism, thus distinguishing friend from foe.

This consolidated power was successful in demolishing an old order that has lasted for thousands of years, turning the Chinese society into a blank sheet of paper on which, in Mao's words, "the freshest and most beautiful pictures can be painted" (画最新最美的图画).

Undoubtedly, there were real conflicts of interest beneath these labels, but the labelling had greatly exaggerated the extent of the conflicts, created a zero-sum playbook, and obscured the opportunities for mutual interests and peace.

These labels, as well as others that proliferated or were reinvented in political struggles, had stereotyped and dehumanised individuals, devoured lives and families, and led to countless acts of violence and tragedies.

More than two decades of violent revolutionary war have shaped the CCP's modus operandi of instinctively going back to identity politics to paint "the freshest and most beautiful pictures" upon seizing power - building a new world by demolishing the old one. The CCP does not know of any other way because its philosophy, organisational structure, power distribution and political culture are developed based on this. A revolutionary party that lives for revolutionary movements, the CCP would be at a loss without them.

Consequently, we witnessed movement after movement since the establishment of the PRC, including the Land Reform Movement (土改), the Three-anti and Five-anti Campaigns (三反五反), the People's Commune Movement (公社化), the Great Leap Forward (大跃进), the Socialist Education Movement (社会主义教育运动), also known as the Four Cleanups Movement (四清运动), as well as the Cultural Revolution which comprised many smaller movements.

Somewhere in between, Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping, who represented the interests of the party-state establishment, hoped to establish a "normal order" to systematically develop the nation. However, they were labelled as capitalist roaders by Mao and were discredited and disgraced, with Liu paying with his life.

Ultimately, Mao failed to realise his ideal society. He lived a solitary life in his old age and was a recluse in the years before his demise, often shedding forlorn tears.

Since China's reforms and opening up, Deng Xiaoping's theory of cats - "it doesn't matter if a cat is black or white, as long as it catches mice"- was followed by Jiang Zemin's "amass great wealth quietly" and Hu Jintao's "avoid self-inflicted setbacks". Before long, academics started discussing the CCP's transformation from a revolutionary party to a governing party, as if the era of revolution was over.

However, party organisations, especially at the grassroots level, quickly fell apart once they lost their traditional functions as danwei (单位, work units). As these were drastically eroded by market forces, corruption became the greatest threat to the ruling party.

To salvage the party, Xi Jinping has initiated a protracted and high-intensity campaign against corruption as well as party rectification.

Xi's goal appears to be modelled after the CCP during the Yan'an Rectification Movement (1942-1945), when the party was united, alert, earnest, lively, idealistic, vibrant, disciplined, uncorrupted, compliant, with noble spirit, and dedicated.

He reinforced the authority of party organisations at all levels across the nation, and expanded such authority to new areas created by marketisation, including private enterprises, foreign enterprises, market intermediaries, religious and charitable organisations, and other social organisations.

He further revived Mao's slogan that "the party exercises overall leadership over all areas of endeavour in every part of the country". In other words, he has brought back the old party-building model and developed it further by following its logic.

As the CCP has only one such traditional model, any attempt at party rectification must begin with this model, which also has a power structure that impedes innovation. After more than ten years of effort, the state of the party has greatly improved, at least in terms of its discipline and organisational structure. However, this brings back the question that Mao faced in his time: can revolutionary methods bring about successful development? This question can only be answered by an objective review of the success and failure of the Mao era.

Mao succeeded in building a system that ensured national unity, political stability and social compliance. Even a major upheaval like the Cultural Revolution neither fragmented the nation nor wobbled the CCP's rule. But while the planned economy consolidated the CCP's standing, the party lacked dynamism, efficiency, innovation and entrepreneurial spirit. This was the fundamental reason why socialism lost the competition with capitalism.

Ultimately, Mao neither realised his revolutionary ideals nor successfully developed the economy. At the time of his passing, China's economy was on the brink of collapse. His successors had no choice but to completely change tack. Based on this, it is questionable whether the old party building model was the correct way in the era of the planned economy, let alone in today's market economy that has integrated with the global capitalist economic system.

Without a doubt, this model will keep the CCP in power, but it is uncertain whether it can lead to successful national rejuvenation.

The current reality is that left-wing politics is on the rise, and identity politics of the working class vs the capitalists rears its ugly head from time to time. Many entrepreneurs, technical professionals and high-net-worth individuals have emigrated. Most local governments have lost the enthusiasm for innovation and entrepreneurship, with many cadres opting out of the rat race, preferring to lie flat. Intellectuals are fearful of speaking up.

There is no longer anything exciting in the annual Two Sessions, and private investment sentiments wane and foreign enterprises exit the China market in quick succession. Lacking confidence in the future, ordinary people tighten their belts at a time when the authorities advocate consumption for economic growth.

China's economic growth has been on a downward trend since Hu's second term of office, unlike the crests and troughs of the past. More importantly, the people detect no sign of new drivers of growth and are struggling to adapt to low growth as the norm.

Globally, the CCP is predisposed to getting drawn into the identity politics maelstrom because of its heritage.

Mao's approach to diplomacy faithfully executed Marxist-Leninist proletarian internationalism. China took part in the Korean War, supported the third world's struggles against imperialism and colonialism for national independence, and took up the mantle as the global leader of revolutions. It later proposed the Three Worlds Theory and initiated a united front against the two hegemons of the Soviet Union and the US.

Like in domestic politics, the main theme here is also "struggle". Now, under domestic and external pressures, the CCP may revert to Mao's approach. Promoting the Maoist fighting spirit, it has already proposed the "Four Greats": the great struggle, great project, great cause and great dream (伟大斗争、伟大工程、伟大事业、伟大梦想).

The term "great project" was coined by Mao in Yan'an to specifically refer to party building, and it is one of the "three magic weapons" (the united front, armed struggle, and party building) of the Chinese Communist Revolution which is also viewed by Xi as a decisive factor in national rejuvenation.

Party building has been at the core of Xi's work for more than a decade. The external environment for China's continued emergence has drastically deteriorated since 2018. China's rapid emergence has resulted in fear in some nations. A reason for this fear is that they believe that China is reverting to the communist model that took them over 40 years of the Cold War to demolish. These are closely linked to the party's somewhat heedless return to its old heritage with the slogan "staying true to our original aspiration" (不忘初心).

Although the CCP has worked hard to promote ideological and political education, very few, including party officials, truly believe in Marxism. Globally, Marxism has failed to contribute to economic growth and business competitiveness, while its theories on class struggle, private ownership exploitation and the need for its abolition have had significant negative implications, including scaring off business leaders, demoralising intellectuals, and leaving many party cadres perplexed and turning to formalism and bureaucratism to fill their day. Even the informers that were prevalent in the Soviet era, have to some extent returned.

All this has made it easier for "hostile Western forces" to portray China as an "evil empire" like the Soviet Union, and fuelled their identity politics to ensnare the CCP.

The truth is that today's China is a far cry from the Soviet Union and China of the Mao era, and there exist many common interests and abundant win-win opportunities between China and the West.

Currently, deglobalisation and, in particular, the efforts to decouple from China benefit no one, as they increase economic costs and reduce economic efficiency. Identity politics, with ideology at its core, is what propels these Western countries' naive ways of achieving a pyrrhic victory.

While the Western nations have different interests, their ideology is remarkably aligned. The CCP's utmost priority is to avoid being constrained by others' definitions and to present a new image of socialism with Chinese characteristics, instead of simply putting new wine in old bottles. This requires the creation of a new narrative that better reflects current China and genuinely communicates with the world so as to gain wider acceptance.

However, the difficulty is that the CCP leadership is familiar only with the old narrative, and its attempts to innovate in this area are hardly sufficient. Instead, the party's old heritage is eroding China's achievements in its reforms and fuelling society's discontent. Together with the remnant influences from the Mao era, they are causing China to regress. Neither the West nor China's younger generations will like this outcome. The ideological middle ground in which China currently finds itself is devoid of theories, in contrast to the two ideological extremes of Marxism-Leninism and liberalism which possess complete narratives supported by theories.

This is the fundamental reason for the longstanding and futile struggle between the left and right in China. The public at large distrusts both but lacks the theory, concept and narrative to express its interests and ideals, which is a failure of the academia and the social sciences in China.

However, the blame is not entirely theirs because they are subordinate to the power structure, where there is little room for innovation when the authorities are preoccupied with ideological correctness. The authorities lack the capability and energy to innovate because they are themselves in this situation, which makes it impossible for them to escape the influence of the past that has shaped their formative years and worldview.

Without sufficient theoretical innovation, China will be burdened by increasingly prevalent identity politics both externally and domestically. Externally, it is being grouped into the Axis of Evil that includes Russia, North Korea, Iran and other disgruntled nations. Domestically, the flames of the Cultural Revolution are being stoked.

In the end, the old-fashioned way of party building may save the party at the expense of the nation, drastically diminishing "the great cause of national rejuvenation".

This article was first published in Lianhe Zaobao as "跳出身份政治的漩涡".

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