It's all about power: US-China relations set to remain rocky in 2024

Similar to the aftermath of the November 2022 US-China G20 Bali summit, the 15 November 2023 US-China APEC summit has raised hopes for a US-China "reset" for reduced tensions and greater cooperation. But just as the Bali summit did not foster a reset, nor will the APEC summit. Expectations that US-China summits and greater dialogue and communication can ease conflict reflect a fundamental misunderstanding of the sources of the US-China competition.

The US does not seek summits with China to mitigate competition or seek compromises over Taiwan, trade or technology. At both the Bali summit and the APEC summit, It offered no proposals to reduce conflict. Rather, the Biden administration says it wants summits to keep open communication channels. That is, it wants to talk in order to talk. But talking to talk will not contribute to greater cooperation. The Biden administration also says it wants to establish "guardrails" for competition. But the purpose of guardrails is to allow the US maintain its current policies with reduced risk of crises and war.

Growing US-China competition and conflict does not reflect misunderstanding, misperceptions or a lack of dialogue. And this is not simply a spiralling tit-for-tat contention that requires reciprocal moves to enable de-escalation. Rather, the US and China understand each other perfectly well. Each country has national objectives and each has developed policies to advance those objectives. And each country opposes the other's objectives. US-China conflict reflects a great power conflict of interest.

The rise of Chinese economic and military capabilities allows China to pursue a long-deferred objective - the weakening of American alliances in East Asia and the corresponding erosion of US military encirclement of China's maritime periphery from the Korean peninsula to the South China Sea. Over the past decade, Chinese coercive diplomacy against Vietnam, the Philippines and South Korea aimed to dissuade them from expanding defence cooperation with the US.

China is also using its greater economic clout to assume a voice in the global order commensurate with its authority and responsibility. The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and Chinese resistance to cooperation with the International Monetary Fund over post-Covid debt restructuring in the developing world reflects its opposition to US dominance of the global order. China is intent on using its global economic presence to achieve its own interest in the global order.

But whether or not China adopts coercive policies against US security partners or actively resists US global leadership matters little for US alliances or the trend in the global order. The changing US-China maritime balance of power and the Chinese Navy's persistent and growing presence throughout regional waters, as well as its growing economic clout, requires the local powers to accommodate Chinese security interests, to the detriment of US security in East Asia. And the rise of the Chinese economy requires countries throughout the world to work closer with China on global problems.

Thus, US policy reflects its determination to resist the rise of China capabilities and the corresponding implications for the regional balance of power, the US alliance system in East Asia, and US global leadership. US officials make clear that the US has adopted military, economic and technology policies to deny China the capabilities to challenge America's comprehensive superiority and its regional and global leadership. President Biden says that the US seeks to compete with China. In this competition, the US objective is not to come in second or achieve a tie, but to win.

The Biden administration has kept in place the Trump administration's tariffs on Chinese exports to the US because they believe that the tariffs give the US leverage over China to weaken China's economic system. Unlike any other advanced industrial economy, the administration maintains high tariffs on Chinese electric cars, despite its insistence that it seeks cooperation with China on climate change. US officials also make clear that US restrictions on technology cooperation with China aim to prevent China from challenging US military superiority. And the White House has argued that the US must resist the rise of China so that the US can lead the global order.

In security affairs, the Biden administration has strengthened security cooperation with South Korea and the Philippines to resist the effects of the rise of China on US alliances. During the Trump administration, there was economic and fishing cooperation between China and the Philippines, Vietnam and South Korea, and there was stability in the South China Sea. This trend benefited China, but at the expense of US security. US defence policy aims to arrest this trend and strengthen US military presence in regional waters.

Following the APEC summit, Chinese and US policies have reinforced each side's effort to wage the conflict of interest. Within days of the summit, China carried out large-scale air and naval exercises in close proximity to Taiwan, signalling its resistance to US-Taiwan defence cooperation and its effort to influence the outcome of the January 2023 Taiwan presidential election. China's fishing fleet swarmed in the Philippine-claimed exclusive economic zone, maintaining Chinese pressure on the Philippines to constrain its defence cooperation with the US.

The US has been equally active in resisting the rise of China. Shortly after the summit, the secretary of commerce requested a larger budget to strengthen resistance to US corporate technology cooperation with Chinese industries. The Biden administration also strengthened its resistance to climate cooperation by imposing new restrictions on US electric car makers' ability to use Chinese materials in car batteries. And the US Navy carried out a "freedom of navigation operation" in close proximity to Chinese-claimed islands near Vietnam.

Within weeks of the APEC summit, the US conducted air and naval exercises within Philippine waters near Taiwan and China carried out live-fire naval exercises in the South China Sea.

Heightened US-China competition and tension reflects the conflict of interest between a rising power, determined to strengthen its security and voice in world affairs, and a declining power, determined to maintain its security and its dominant role in world affairs. It reflects Chinese reliance on its greater capabilities to achieve its objectives and corresponding US resistance to the rise of Chinese power to maintain US military superiority and global leadership.

Mere policy moderation by either country will not moderate the conflict. This is a conflict over relative capabilities and the balance of power. As long as the US-China power transition persists, US-China competition over the distribution of power will persist.

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