Hong Kong: The state of statelessness

After five months, the protests in Hong Kong have not totally subsided, and there has been a direct cost to its economy, social order, and the lives of ordinary people. The latest figures show that Hong Kong's productivity in the third quarter dropped by 2.9% year-on-year, the lowest in ten years, putting Hong Kong's economy in a technical recession.

The extradition bill has been formally withdrawn, but the protesters are still going strong. Apparently, the focus has shifted to "police violence". But is that what this movement is really about? What is it exactly that has allowed the protesters to stick together, united in resistance? In an essay published on 30 October, Associate Professor Brian Fong of The Education University of Hong Kong provided his explanation, giving an insight into the protest movement.

As a member of the younger and middle-aged generation of the pan-democrats, Prof Fong joined some 30 other pan-democrats in releasing a resolution on the future of Hong Kong in 2016, proposing that Hong Kongers unite to fight for self-determination, and move towards long-term autonomy.

Three years later, Prof Fong describes Hong Kongers as a "stateless nation struggling for autonomy", and calls this resistance a "Water Revolution", as the latest chapter in Hong Kong's movement for autonomy.

He goes on to say that Hong Kong took shape in 1949, and when the British transferred Hong Kong's sovereignty to China, they also transferred "a young stateless nation, the Hong Kongers".

Over the months of protests, the protesters have roused the ire of Beijing and the mainland Chinese with their desecration of the Chinese emblem and flag, shocking observers. Commentators in Hong Kong have explained that to Hong Kongers, the Chinese emblem and flag are just "totemic images" without much significance; Prof Fong's essay highlighting Hong Kongers as a "young stateless nation" offers an even more direct and blunt interpretation.

Do Hong Kongers all have no sense of nation? Of course, we cannot generalise. But the words and actions of many protesters do reflect that to their minds, Hong Kong can survive and grow without relying on the "motherland", and mainland China's demands on Hong Kong can be disregarded. Compared to Taiwanese who feel a desperate sense for the nearing doom of a nation, what Hong Kongers feel is a sense of "statelessness". This has to do with Hong Kong's unique situation and history, and Hong Kongers' unique experience.

During the long period of colonial rule, the responsibility and duty of national defence did not fall to Hong Kongers. After the return to mainland China, in line with Hong Kong's Basic Law, defence and diplomacy did not fall under the purview of the SAR government, nor did Hong Kong bear the cost of building and maintaining its military strength. Hong Kongers also did not have to serve in the military.

The feeling of "statelessness" or a weak sense of nation is also partly due to the fact that both before and after the return, Beijing and Hong Kongers had different understandings of "one country, two systems" and "a high degree of autonomy". At the time, Beijing did not have enough confidence in managing the international financial hub that is Hong Kong. Faced with the challenge of capitalist Hong Kong returning to socialist mainland China, Beijing interpreted "one country, two systems" as staying separate, and did not sufficiently emphasise the authority of "one country" or Hong Kong's duty towards "one country". At the same time, for some Hong Kongers, maintaining the Hong Kong way of life meant continuing a life with little duty to the country.

It has to be pointed out that when the Sichuan earthquake and the Beijing Olympics happened in 2008, patriotism and passion among Hong Kongers were sincere and intense. However, it gradually faded, and with the influx of parallel traders and arrests of Hong Kong booksellers, the rift between mainland China and Hong Kong deepened. A sense of autonomy rose in Hong Kong, and efforts by Beijing to clearly define the powers under "one country" were seen as "bullying" Hong Kong and met with resistance. Those supportive of autonomy for Hong Kong do not feel the way out is for Hong Kong to smoothen its relationship with the central government; on the contrary, they are seeking to leverage global geopolitical changes and the doubts of the international community roused by China's rise, to gain international support for Hong Kong to become a truly independent political entity.

They believe that the road may be tough, but the goal is attainable. Many Western-educated pan-democratic Hong Kong academics feel that the global system will guarantee Hong Kong's safety and growth.

However, bringing the Hong Kong issue to the international stage is in fact also bringing Hong Kong affairs into the US' scope of influence. Hong Kong analysts feel that most candidates for the District Council elections in November qualified possibly because of concerns about the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act passed by the US Congress, and of sanctions against anyone seen as violating Hong Kong's human rights. The fact that only one candidate has been disqualified for not upholding the Basic Law suggests the US factor in Hong Kong's domestic politics.

However, while we cannot simply conclude that "stateless" represents how most Hong Kongers feel, it is a fact that the protests are clearly political and smack of independence for Hong Kong. How will this affect Beijing's policies towards Hong Kong? Will Beijing remain indifferent? Hong Kong was discussed at the recent fourth plenary session of the Party Central Committee. How Beijing will proceed and how the situation in Hong Kong will develop will become clearer, especially during the District Council elections this month.